In this paper, we analyze the legal situation regarding physician-assisted suicide in the world. Our hypothesis is that the prohibitive stance on physician-assisted suicide in most societies in the world today seems to be related to our moral attitudes toward suicide. This brings us to a discussion about life itself. We claim that the total lack of legal protection for physician-assisted suicide from international organizations and most countries in the world lies in a philosophical assumption that supports much of our (...) common beliefs about what life really is. This assumption states that life must be thought of as not belonging exclusively to the individual. We argue that this assumption is a misconception that can be heard in the debate on suicide. Consequently we endorse a different conception of life which tends to favor a pro-choice stance towards suicide and assisted death in general. This position takes the patient’s decision about when to die more seriously. We conclude that there is no reason why physician-assisted suicide does not deserve legal protection as an individual right to die under international law. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Reviewed by: Hume’s Imagination by Tito MAGRI Don Garrett MAGRI, Tito. Hume’s Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. xiii + 494 pp. Cloth, $115.00In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume defines “the imagination” in an inclusive sense as “the faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas”—that is, those that are not memories. In the narrower sense, it is “the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative (...) and probable reasonings.” Book 1 of the Treatise is largely a work about the imagination in the inclusive sense. Indeed, by Magri’s count, book 1 contains more occurrences of the term imagination/imagine and its variants than of any other philosophical term with the exceptions of impression and idea. Yet until the late 1990s, it was surprisingly rare to find commentators treating the Humean imagination as a focus of attention in its own right, and the complete range of its many roles and operations has largely remained uncatalogued until now. With twelve highly detailed chapters distinguishing no fewer than twenty different “works of the imagination” governed by eighteen different “principles,” Hume’s Imagination is by far the most comprehensive treatment of the faculty to date. Indeed, its only limitations are its two announced ones. First, it does not discuss the imagination in Hume’s subsequent An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (where its operations receive much less attention) or other writings. Second, it does not discuss the extensive roles played by the imagination in Treatise, book 2 (“Of the Passions”) and book 3 (“Of Morals”)—although readers may hope that a sequel will take up those roles. The wide array of roles and operations that Hume attributes to the inclusive imagination, even in Treatise, book 1 alone, naturally raises the question of how much real unity it has as a psychological natural kind. Magri’s original and provocative answer to this question is that the various operations of Hume’s imagination are unified by their filling in various “cognitive gaps” between the representational contents of the mind’s sensations and memories, on the one hand, and the full range of its cognitive contents and capacities, on the other. Rather than appealing to the kind of purely intellectual ideas posited by Descartes and other so-called rationalists who drew a strong distinction between the intellect and the imagination, however, Hume traces our further abilities to the inferences and mental transitions that the imagination produces utilizing only broadly imagistic ideas. In support of this answer, the book is divided into five parts. Part I, chapter 1 explains the central notion of a “cognitive gap” in terms of a “dualism of representation and inference.” For Magri, “representation” applies only to sensation and memory (although he grants that [End Page 156] “presentation” might be the better term in the case of sensation), as governed by Hume’s self-described first principle: “our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.” This principle is the topic of chapter 2. “Inference” (or, more broadly, “transitions”) applies only to the imagination, which generates new “nonrepresentational” cognitive content in accordance with what Hume calls his second principle: “the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas.” This principle is the topic of chapter 3. To say, as Magri does, that the only “representational” ideas for Hume are those of memory sounds highly paradoxical, but the intended (nonparadoxical) meaning becomes clear enough on careful reading. Part 2 of the book takes up the role of the imagination in generating specifically conceptual modes of thought. In chapter 4, Magri explains the mind’s capacity for generality in thought through the operation of “abstract ideas” and its capacity to distinguish different aspects of an object through the operation of “distinctions of reason.” In chapter 5, he examines the generation of distinctively modal content through the capacity of the imagination to conceive the same object as having different qualities or being placed in different circumstances. Part 3 turns to the crucial topic of the imagination’s generation of cognition of a world of “realities” beyond sensation and memory through the production of “causal ideas.” Chapter 6... (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende mostrar cómo en la filosofía de Andrés Bello puede llegar a comprenderse el cuerpo como suposición y como una entidad propuesta con anterioridad empírica que hace posible la comprensión del dinamismo de la propia realidad y a la vez la coexistencia de los fenómenos en el mundo. Además, el papel de medium ejercido por esta corporalidad permitiría dar cuenta de la referencialidad en la relación mundo-mente. Todo ello enmarcado bajo una posible deriva fenomenalista lingüística del propio (...) autor a través de la defensa del juicio como aquél que actúa como referencia del significado de la propia sensación para poder dar validez y existencia a las propias percepciones e ideas. (shrink)

Estoy interesado en indagar ¿cómo es que nuestros pensamientos demostrativos dependientes directamente de la experiencia son acerca de ciertos objetos materiales? ¿Cuál es, y cómo es la relación entre un estado mental y cierto objeto material cuando el primero es acerca del segundo? Esto es, ¿en qué consiste que el pensamiento demostrativo refiera a un objeto material? ¿Cómo es que nuestros pensamientos demostrativos acerca del mundo material se refieren a objetos del mundo material? Creo que existen dos maneras muy generales (...) de responder a esta pregunta, y cada una de estas maneras depende de la versión de la teoría de la mente que se tenga. Por un lado, existe una versión Fregeana de la mente, según la cual existen modos de presentación que delinean la forma de la mente y que determinan cuáles son los objetos acerca de los cuales la mente tiene pensamientos. Existe otra versión más científica de la mente la cual llamo No-Fregeana, según la cual no existen modos de presentación que determinen acerca de cuáles cosas la mente tiene pensamientos, sino más bien son las relaciones causales (quizá desarrolladas evolutivamente) que existen entre clases de cosas y clases de estados mentales las que determinan acerca de cuáles objetos la mente tiene pensamientos. Lo que deseo hacer es mostrar por qué creo que el tratamiento no-Fregeano de la pregunta no da una explicación satisfactoria de cómo es posible que una mente pueda tener pensamientos demostrativos verdaderos acerca de objetos materiales. Mis reparos tienen que ver con la manera como conciben la conexión entre la mente y el mundo para que el pensamiento sea posible. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este articulo pretende describir el concepto de subjetividad nómade desarrollado por Rosi Braidotti, teniendo en cuenta su estructura con respecto a la diferencia sexual. Este análisis permite comprender cuál es la configuración del sujeto nómade revisando las implicaciones que tiene asociar tal concepto con la búsqueda de aceptación y representación de esa diferencia en el contexto político. La lectura critica de Braidotti remite directamente a examinar los conceptos originales de Deleuze y Guattari referidos al nomadismo, como singularización, devenir y (...) subjetivación. ABSTRACT This article aims to describe the concept of nomadic subjectivity developed by Rosi Braidotti, while considering its structure with respect to sexual difference. This analysis allows us to understand the configuration of the nomadic subject by reviewing the implications of associating the concept with the search for acceptance and representation of the sexual difference in the political context. A critical reading of Braidotti means to examine the Deleuze and Guattari's original concepts about nomadism, such as singularization, becoming and subjectivation. (shrink)

Authors De Marco and colleagues have presented a new model on the concept of invasiveness, redefining both its technical definition and practical implementation.1 While the authors raise valid critiques regarding the discrepancy in definitions, I cannot help but wonder about the purpose of redefining terms for which little confusion, if any, exists? This commentary seeks to scrutinise the rationale supporting the new model in the absence of significant clinical confusion and to explore the implications for clinical practice. Initially, one may (...) notice there is no mention of clinical relevancy, confusion among patients or whether the discrepancy in terms is causing miscommunication. It seems reasonable that some clinical confusion may exist, but so too does a similar imbalance of terms when speaking technically across the specialties; take depression and its definition as a primary example. While I certainly agree with the illustration of non-invasive prenatal testing being compared with venous blood draws as a disparity in terminology, little evidence suggests confusion concerning the nosology.2 The medical community, including both physicians and patients, recognises that the terminology is specifically used within the …. (shrink)

The chapter 'Of power' of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding is a very fine discussion of agency and a very complex piece of philosophy. It is the result of the superimposition of at least three layers of text (those of the first, second and fifth editions of the Essay), expressive of widely differing views of the same matters. The argument concerning agency and free will that it puts forward (as it now stands, reporting Locke's last word on the subject) is (...) thus beset with problems, and even inconsistencies. But these textual and analytical difficulties should not hide from us the relevance and, in a way, the deep coherence of Locke's philosophy of action. In what follows, I will attempt to cast some light on this complicated interpretive and conceptual matter, by a careful reading of some parts of Locke's discussion. The first section shows how accounting for the evaluation and choice of remote goods, in terms of their real value and in preference to smaller, nearer ones, is a crucial problem for Locke's philosophy of action. The second section reads Locke's move from an internalist to an externalist view of motivation as a first, conceptually complex step towards such an account; and shows how this is linked to a change in the concept of will. The third and fourth sections reconstruct Locke's account (a pattern of suspension and examination of occurrent desire); discuss the role of the motivational and normative concept of happiness; and cast some doubt on the consistency of Locke's position. (shrink)

En su célebre viaje a las mansiones celestes, encontró Mahoma en el sétimo cielo “compuesto todo de clarísima luz, un ánjel de setenta mil cabezas; cada cabeza tenía otras tantas bocas, cada boca setenta mil lenguas, i cada lengua hablaba setenta mil idiomas con que alababa las glorias del Señor.” ¿Por qué no existe en el Mundo de Colon un políglota semejante que dia i noche pregone las alabanzas i las glorias de la paz? Podrá observárseme que este vocero celestial (...) seria innecesario, no habiendo hoi en el Nuevo Mundo quien no conozca la necesidad i las ventajas de la paz. Tal observacion careceria desde luego de fuerza. Que el ánjel de la paz pudiera en nuestras Repúblicas predicar en un desierto, se concibe; pero que su voz no fuese necesaria en ellas, puede al ménos ponerse en duda. Los hispano-americanos, en teoría todos somos partidarios de la paz; pero en la práctica, es lo cierto que la paz desaparece frecuentemen te, sin saberse cómo, de entre las manos de sus amigos entusiastas. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Direct Passions Pleasure and Desire Reason and Passion References Further Reading.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page 60-62, June 2011.

This paper seeks to propose the peacebuilding as an activity that favors and facilitates interreligious dialogue in Colombia. The eradication of symbolic violence requires the collaborative work of all citizens and institutions, particularly the religious institution. Religions and their organizations have legal constitutional conditions, which recognize, respect and promote freedom of religion and worship, against which they are expected to continue making a significant contribution to peacebuilding. The golden rule, which is part of the reservation of meaning, present in each (...) of them, can serve as an inspiration to take decisions that lead to the social transformation that peacebuilding requires. (shrink)

El escrito busca argumentar la postulación de san Basilio como un relato de Dios para la Iglesia de todos los tiempos. Se recoge información de las obras del mismo personaje y de aquellos que compartieron con él, además, se apela a comentarios de especialistas que se destacan por el conocimiento del personaje y sus obras. La exposición aborda la experiencia familiar, algunos hechos significativos de su proceso formativo, su incursión en la vida monacal, su ejercicio pastoral como presbítero y obispo (...) de Cesarea, y el carácter contextual de sus escritos. (shrink)

El presente artículo busca dar razón de la categoría paideia como estructura fundamental del quehacer teológico de Gregorio de Nisa. En función de este propósito se hace un acercamiento a la noción de paideia propia de los griegos y, posteriormente se señala la manera como el Niseno apropió dicha categoría configurando la paideia cristiana, apelando a ejemplos de su obra De Vita Moysis. This article seeks to give reason for the category paideia as a fundamental structure of the theological enterprise (...) of Gregory of Nyssa. According to this purpose is made an approach to the concept of paideia own of the Greeks and subsequently notes how the bishop of Nyssa appropriated that category by configuring the Christian paideia, appealing to examples of his work De Vita Moysis. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to show that the version of epistemological infinitism defended by Peter Klein is externalistic in character. I present the most important questions infinitism is supposed to resolve and also present the fundamental difference regarding internalism and externalism in epistemology. I conclude with an indication of what would be the best way to understand infinitism and how to evade the problems that emerge from Klein’s externalist infinitism.

Le rapprochement des œuvres de Machiavel et de Bodin a déjà une longue histoire, à laquelle l’intention de cet article n’est pas d’ajouter un chapitre : il ne s’agit donc pas de proposer une lecture d’ensemble du rapport entre ces deux auteurs ou entre leurs doctrines générales, mais seulement de mettre en parallèle leurs conceptions d’une certaine méthode pour interpréter les histoires, conceptions qui se laissent lire d’une part dans l’épître dédicatoire et le proemio des Discorsi sopra la prima deca (...) di Tito Livio de Machiavel (ca. 1518) et d’autre part dans l’épître dédicatoire et le proemium de la Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem de Bodin (1566). À un demi-siècle d’écart, ces deux prologues mettent en effet en évidence le caractère indispensable d’un art de la lectio des histoires pour fonder les raisonnements de la science politique, mais ils le font, semble-t-il, en adoptant deux points de vue profondément différents : la nature exacte de cette différence est le véritable objet de cet article. (shrink)

Este artículo reseña: Carlos Ramón Fernández Liesa, Juan Daniel Oliva Martínez, y Oscar Pérez de la Fuente (eds.), Soberanía, Colección Gregorio Peces-Barba, Dykinson, Madrid, 2022, 172 pp.

O problema do conhecimento fácil tem sido definido na literatura epistemológica contemporânea com um problema que nasce de duas formas distintas. O propósito deste ensaio é mostrar que essas supostas maneiras diferentes de gerar o mesmo problema em verdade originam dois problemas distintos, que requerem respostas distintas. Um deles está relacionado à aquisição fácil (inaceitável) de conhecimento de primeira-ordem e o outro à aquisição fácil (inaceitável) de conhecimento de segunda-ordem. Além disso, é apresentada a maneira como o infinitismo, a teoria (...) epistêmica segundo a qual as razões que justificam uma opinião devem ser infinitas em número e não-repetidas, pode lidar com cada um desses problemas. (shrink)

Hepatocellular carcinoma represents the third leading cause of cancer-related death. Because HCC is multicentric with time, excluding the few transplanted patients, sooner or later it becomes untreatable with loco-regional therapies and, until some years ago, it was not responsive to systemic therapies. In 2005 a randomized trial indicated the efficacy of a product containing stem cell differentiation stage factors taken from zebrafish embryos during the stage in which the totipotent stem cells are differentiating into the pluripotent adult stem cells. In (...) such a trial the patients, with “intermediate” and “advanced” HCC according to Barcelona Clinic Liver Cancer/American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases guidelines, presented benefit in terms of performance status and objective tumoral response, with some cases of complete response, that is, sustained disappearance of the neoplastic areas or blood supply therein, accompanied by normalization of alpha-fetoprotein... (shrink)

La atención conjunta se da cuando dos sujetos atienden al mismo objeto a la vez, y el hecho es cognitivamente abierto. Existen dos enfoques al respecto: el primero reconoce que cada sujeto sabe que el otro está percibiendo lo mismo, es decir, es un co-perceptor; se trata, entonces, de explicar en qué consiste ser un co-perceptor. El segundo enfoque resalta que los sujetos saben que el objeto está siendo percibido por ambos; en dicho caso, se trata de explicar en qué (...) consiste que un objeto sea percibido como perceptualmente compartido. En este texto se analizan las razones del primer enfoque para mostrar por qué es desorientador; y se dan razones para validar el segundo enfoque. La respuesta a la apertura cognitiva abre el camino a la futura investigación en atención conjunta. (shrink)

El artículo muestra las relaciones de amistad que se van tornando en reflexiones filosóficas entre Cioran y el escritor italiano Mario Andrea Rigoni, a partir de su obra: Cioran dans mes souvenirs. Nuestro interés está en dar a conocer las reflexiones que hace Rigoni sobre la obra y el carácter humano de Cioran.

Abstract:I suggest that Hume’s recantation, in the Appendix to the Treatise, of his account of the idea of personal identity in section 1.4.6 hinges on the contrast between the first-personal cognitive roles of that idea and its imagination-based explanation. In stark, if implicit, contrast with Locke, Hume’s account divorces personal identity from consciousness, considering oneself as oneself. But, later in the Appendix, Hume realized, if imperfectly, that something was missing from the idea of self he had constructed. I suggest that (...) what is missing is the intimate consciousness of ourselves that idea should allow us to achieve. While Hume despaired to find a solution to this problem, a change in the background of his earlier theory—a change he had available and which is perhaps alluded to in a letter to Kames—could have made his original account consistent with the first-personal features of the idea of self. (shrink)

Acknowledgments I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Jakob Amstutz for his continual feedback during my writing of this work. ...

Entification is now displayed in its nude and native state, and serves to explain the constant mental process, and the true nature of the representations of ...

A central issue of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how a large collection of coupled neurons combines external signals with internal memories into new coherent patterns of meaning. An external stimulus localized at some input spreads over a large assembly of coupled neurons, building up a collective state univocally corresponding to the stimulus. Thus, the synchronization of spike trains of many individual neurons is the basis of a coherent perception. Based on recent investigations of homoclinic chaotic systems and their synchronization, (...) a novel conjecture for the dynamics of single neurons and, consequently, for neuron assemblies is formulated. Homoclinic chaos is proposed as a suitable way to code information in time by trains of equal spikes occurring at apparently erratic times. In order to classify the set of different perceptions, the percept space can be given a metric structure by introducing a distance measure between distinct percepts. The distance in percept space is conjugate to the duration of the perception in the sense that an uncertainty relation in percept space is associated with time-limited perceptions. This coding of different percepts by synchronized spike trains entails fundamental quantum features which are not restricted to microscopic phenomena. It is conjectured that they are related to the details of the perceptual chain rather than depending on Planck's action. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay presents the chief reasons for making a distinction between propositional and doxastic justification and, also, points out two things: no theory of propositional justification implies a theory of doxastic justification; infinitism is, essentially, a theory of propositional justification. Additionally, this paper tries to shed some light on the three conjointly sufficient conditions for a proper infinitist view of propositional justification.

O problema do critério é um dos mais importantes da epistemologia. A resposta que se dá a ele definirá um aspecto fundamental das teorias do conhecimento. Neste ensaio, o problema do critério é apresentado e algumas das conseqüências geradas pela aceitação de exigências metaepistemicas são analisadas. Em especial, essas conseqüências são avaliadas em relação ao infinitismo – a teoria epistemológica segundo a qual as razões que sustentam nossas crenças devem ser infinitas em número e não-repetidas. Ao final, sustenta-se que cláusulas (...) que exigem que a metajustificação seja necessária para o conhecimento não apenas tornam as teorias epistemológicas mais plausíveis, mas também que a ausência de tais exigências acaba criando problemas muito difíceis, como o assim chamado “problema do conhecimento fácil”. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Infinitismo. Problema do critério. Metajustificação. Conhecimento. Metaconhecimento. Ceticismo. ABSTRACT This essay discusses the Problem of the Criterion, one of the most important problems in Epistemology. The answer given to this problem will shape a fundamental aspect of theories of knowledge. It also analyzes some of the consequences epistemological theories may face in accepting metaepistemological requirements. These consequences are given special consideration with regard to Infinitism, the epistemological theory according to which the reasons that support our beliefs must be infinite and non-repeating. Finally, this essay claims not only that those propositions that require metajustification make any theory, even Infinitism, more plausible, but also that the absence of such requirements creates difficult problems, such as the so-called “Problem of Easy Knowledge.” KEY WORDS – Infinitism. Problem of the Criterion. Metajustification. Knowledge. Metaknowledge. Skepticism. (shrink)

Microinjection of frog oocytes, a technique whose usefulness for studies on gene expression is already established, may be similarly helpful for the unraveling of several enigmas of cellular metabolism and its organization.